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ARTICLES

THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR CHILDREN
Marvin Ventrell'

2

Lawyers, I suppose, were children once.
I. INTRODUCTION

The selection of Children and the Law as the topic for the
James R. Browning Symposium 3 in 2004 says something

powerful about the status of the practice of law for children and
youth. Not so many years ago, this topic would not have been on
the radar of symposium organizers, or had it been, it would not
1. Marvin Ventrell, JD, is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the
National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) headquartered in Denver, CO. He
is a graduate of the University of Montana School of Law and the recipient of the
American Bar Association National Child Advocacy Law Award. The author wishes to
thank NACC Staff Attorney Amanda George Donnelly for her significant contributions to
this article and NACC Intern Kelly Scott for her assistance. Portions of this article are
adapted from, or first appeared in, Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency
Component of the Juvenile Court, JUv. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998 at 17.
2. CHARLES LAMB, Epigraph to HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Popular
Library 1962) (1960).
3. The Browning Symposium honors Judge James R. Browning of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, who was an original member of the
Montana Law Review and served as Editor-In-Chief. It provides the Bar and general
public with detailed analyses of important legal issues. Past symposia topics include:
The 1972 Montana Constitution: Thirty Years Later; Privacy in Cyberspace; The Militia.
Constitutional and Criminal Law Perspectives; The Proposal to Split the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals; and The Religious Freedom RestorationAct.
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likely have been deemed worthy of such important academic
attention. But children's law 4 exists in 2004 as a recognized
legal specialty with sufficient rigor to warrant law school
symposium scrutiny. Similar to the development of pediatric
medicine, the: field of children's law has developed into a full
academic and practice concentration. Through the development
of social awareness, substantive law, law school curricula,
standards of practice, and career paths, what was once a fringe
professional interest and a cause of social progressives has
become a legal specialty.
The importance of the development of children's law is more
than academic. Children and youth represent a significant
segment of the population 5 in need of legal services, which has
gone unmet for many years. 6 In the juvenile delinquency arena,
roughly 1.8 million cases are filed each year.7 There are even
more child welfare cases in response to the approximate 4
million children who are reported abused and neglected
annually.8 For many of these children, the legal proceedings in
which they are involved determine the course of their lives and
may be a matter of life and death. As lawyers who carry a
special responsibility to promote justice, this is a worthy and
noble focus of our attention. 9

4. Also called juvenile law, pediatric law, child welfare law, and juvenile justice
law. Children are most commonly represented in juvenile delinquency cases and child
welfare (abuse and neglect) cases. Children may also be represented in private custody
cases, adoption cases, and in civil damages proceedings. Children's law is distinguished
from family or matrimonial law in that its focus is the provision of legal service
specifically for children rather than any incidental service provided to children in the
context of representing parents in divorce and custody matters.
5. Minors comprise 25% of the total population of the U.S. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (2002), Table No. 14: Resident
Population by Race, Hispanic Origin and Single Years of Age: 2001, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/pop.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
6.

See STACEY VIOLANTE ET AL., AMERICA'S CHILDREN: STILL AT RISK 65 (ABA

Steering Comm. on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children, 2001).
7.

PUZZANCHERA ET AL, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1999 ch, 2, p. 6 (Nat'l Ctr.

for Juvenile Justice 2003), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/njcda/pdf/jcs99.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
8.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND

FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002 xiii (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office 2004), available at
http://www2.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cmO2/cmO2.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2005).
9. "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibilities for the
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2004 SELECTED
quality of justice."
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2004).
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The failure to provide legal services to this population is
devastating. Just outcomes are dependent upon high quality
legal advocacy. Unrepresented parties tend to fair poorly in our
system. This is particularly true for children who, among
various types of clients, are least likely to be able to speak for
themselves. Yet historically, this argument has failed in the
face of the view that children are not entitled to, or do not need,
traditional legal counsel. This view is changing. We are moving
from a legal system that valued children out of an occasional
sense of benevolence to a system that recognizes the value of
children as rights-based citizens.
Precisely where this movement towards recognizing
children as rights-based citizens will lead is not clear. This
article attempts to trace the evolution of the practice of law for
children and provide some guidance for the decision-making that
lies ahead in the development of an emerging and important
area of law.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN.CLIENT STATUS AND THE
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES
Children's law is a new field of practice, and children have
been represented by legal counsel for a relatively short time.
Although children's interests appear in our early jurisprudence,
it was not until the 1970's that we began to see the legitimate
delivery of legal services to children. The emergence of lawyers
for children in the 1970's is directly connected to the emerging
status of children in society at that time. What we learn from
this is that the value society places on a client class influences, if
not dictates, the level of legal service provided.
The evolution of children's status in western culture can be
viewed as a movement from children as property, to children as
welfare recipients, to children as rights-based citizens. 10 The
degree of legal services available to children corresponds to
these stages. Children viewed as property receive no legal
services since property holders may do essentially as they wish
with their property. Children as a welfare class will receive
such services as the state chooses to grant. These services
promote the state's interest, or at best, what the state views as
the child's interest. But children as rights-based citizens are
situated to receive the full benefit of independent legal counsel

10.

See Ventrell, supra note 1, at 17.
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as they demand the enforcement of their rights.1 1
The importance of viewing children as rights-based citizens
is reflected in the current debates within the federal
government, state legislatures, advocacy organizations, and
court systems over the formation of policy regarding the nature
of legal services provided to children in the abuse and neglect
court system. 12 There is a dilemma over whether to provide
legal counsel to children, and if so, what type of legal service to
provide. The agreed goal is to produce just outcomes for
children, but there is disagreement as to whether legal services
improve outcomes, and to the extent they do, which type of legal
service is best. The debate centers over whether traditional
independent legal counsel empowers children to their detriment,
or whether attorneys serving as guardians ad litem13 ultimately
serve the state and not the child's interests.1 4 The historic
development of children's status provides insight for the debate.

III. THE HISTORIC GROWTH OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
CHILDREN

A. The ParensPatriae:Children as Property
Pre-sixteenth century service to children was minimal and
was provided by the church, if at all.' 5 Children of that time
were seen as property, and as such, warranted no governmental
protection from the property holders. 16 Infanticide, for example,
was sometimes seen as an accepted method for disposing of
undesirable children, and some societies condoned the
7
abandonment or killing of illegitimate children.1

11.
See ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: HOW THE U.S. LEGAL
SYSTEM AFFECTS CHILDREN 33 (2002).

12. The Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires a
representative, but not necessarily an attorney, represent a child. CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. §
5105 (2000). Some states do appoint attorneys to represent children. See SHIRLEY A.
DOBBIN, CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES: REPRESENTATION AS A CRITICAL COMPONENT
OF EFFECTIVE PRACTICE 43 (Nat'l Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges 1998).
13. A guardian ad litem is a "representative" for a child, who may or may not be an
attorney. A guardian ad litem is charged with representing a child's "best interests"
rather than necessarily taking client direction.
14.
ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, & PROTECTION CASES 14 (ABA 1993).
15.
MARY EDNA HELFER ET AL, THE BATTERED CHILD 19 (5th ed. 1997).
16.

Id. at 9, 11.

17.

Id. at 5.
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Significant social change occurred in sixteenth and
seventeenth century England as the family unit became a
greater presence in English society.1 8 As families moved from
communal living arrangements to independence, 19 the
government was forced to deal with poor and arguably
dysfunctional families. As an underclass of poor emerged,
communities became alarmed by vagrancy and crime that was
attributed to the poor. 20 In response, Parliament passed a series
of laws culminating in the Poor Law Act of 1601.21 The poor
laws authorized the governmental removal of children and the
bounding out of children as apprentices. 22 The action occurred
under the government's belief in its authority to care for its
citizenry under the emerging doctrine of parens patriae or
ultimate parent of the state. 23 While there was some element of
government service in this context, the primary motivation
appears to have been to "clean up" the community. 24 The first
representative for a child appears in this period of family law in
the form of a guardian ad litem, which was used sparingly and
typically assisted the state in its actions (usually to facilitate the
passage of property and insure the crown received its tax share
25
of any property transfer).
The poor law system was transplanted into the American
Colonies, and involuntary apprenticeship became an integral
part of North American Poor Law. 26 At this point, the seeds of
American child welfare law were planted. In the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries we saw the beginnings of modern
Massachusetts records from the
abuse and neglect codes.
seventeenth century show, for example, that children were
removed from their parents' homes for failure to provide a
suitable environment. 27 In the eighteenth century, Virginian
18.
19.

Id. at 16.
Id.

20.
5 ELIZ. C. 4 (1562-63) in THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM THE FIFTH YEAR OF
QUEEN MARY TO THE THIRTY-FIFTH YEAR OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 159 (Pickering ed., 1763).

21.
43 ELIZ. C. 2 (1601) in A COLLECTION OF IMPORTANT ENGLISH STATUTES 76 (3d
ed. 1888).
22. Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 259, 259 (1964).
23. Id. at 267.
24.
JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 241 (1997).

CHILD

PROTECTIVE

25. Id. at 237.
26. Stefan A. Risenfield, The FormativeEra of American Public Assistance Law, 43
CAL. L. REV. 214, 223 (1955).
27.

1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 123-124
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children could be removed and apprenticed because of the
condition of their poverty and because their parents were not
28
providing "good breeding."
This poor law system, drawn from England and the doctrine
of parens patriae, truly begins to take hold in the nineteenth
century under similar circumstances that gave rise to the
English Poor Laws. The urbanization and industrialization of
America, coupled with the influx of immigrants, gave rise to a
significant population of poor families and street children. 29 The
Society for Prevention of Pauperism issued a statement in 1823
describing the streets of New York as overrun with pauper
children. 30 In 1825, New York opened the country's first house
31
of refuge.
The New York House of Refuge was authorized by New
York Law, 32 which provided a charter to the Society for the
Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, the successor to the
The authorizing
Society for Prevention of Pauperism. 33
legislation allowed the Society to take children, committed as
34
vagrants or convicted of crimes by authorities, into the house.
35
Criminal conviction was not a condition to incarceration.
Children could be committed by administrative order or
application of their parents. 36 Nor was there any right to
indictment or jury trial,3 7 and certainly not counsel, as summary
conviction of disorderly persons had previously been upheld in
38
New York.
In addition to houses of refuge, reformatories, which were
entirely state-financed, began to emerge toward the middle of
the century. 39 Reformatories were to be progressive institutions
(Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970).
28. Douglas R. Rendleman, ParensPatriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court,
23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 212 (1971).
29.
JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLOGICAL
COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 4 (1998).

30.
Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1189 (1970).
31. Id. at 1187.
32. Laws of New York, 47th Session, Ch. CXXVI at 110 (1824).
33.
Fox, supra note 30, at 1189-90.
34. Id. at 1190.
35. Id. at 1191.
36.

THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 68 (1992). See also Fox,

supra note 30, at 1205 n. 9.
37.
Fox, supra note 30, at 1191.
38. Id. (citing In re Goodhue, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 153 (1816)).
39.

ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 47
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where, through civic and moral training, the youth would be
reformed by a surrogate parent. 40 In reality, reformatories
tended to be coercive, labor intensive incarceration facilities 4 1 in
which youth, once again, could be placed without due process.
The nineteenth century House of Refuge Movement was
validated by the judicial system. In a number of cases during
this period, courts affirmed the practice of intervention into the
lives of children through the doctrine of parens patriae.42 The
courts accepted the logic that they were entitled to take custody
of a child, regardless of the child's status as victim or offender,
of the state's authority and
without due process of law, because
43
children.
"save"
to
obligation
The 1839 Pennsylvania decision of Ex parte Crouse44 may be
,
the first case upholding the Refuge System. The child, Mary
Ann Crouse, was committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge
by a justice of the peace warrant. 45 The warrant, executed by
Mary Ann's mother, provided that it would be in Mary Ann's
interests to be incarcerated in the House because she was
beyond her parents' control. 46 The reported case is an appeal
from a denial of the father's subsequent habeas corpus petition
for his daughter's return. 47 The father argued that the law
allowing commitment of children without due process was
unconstitutional. 48 The court summarily rejected the father's
argument on the basis that the House was not a prison (even
though Mary Ann was not free to leave), and the child was there
for her own reformation, not punishment (even though Mary
The Crouse court
Ann was probably treated harshly).49
sanctioned the state's authority to intervene into the family as

(2nd ed. 1977); WATKINS, supra note 29, at 8.
40.
WATKINS, supra note 29, at 8; See also JOHN E. B. MYERS, A HISTORY OF CHILD
PROTECTION IN AMERICA 42 (2004).
41.

WATKINS, supra note 29, at 9.

42. See, e.g., Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11-12 (Pa. 1839); Fletcher v. People, 52
Ill. 395, 397 (Ill. 1869).
43. See, e.g., Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899, § 1, Ill. Laws 131 (current
version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 (1988)); PLATT, supra note 39, at 8. See also BEN B.
LINDSEY & RUBE BOROUGH, THE DANGEROUS LIFE (1930),

Lindsey's
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

for a discussion of Ben

view of his role as judge of Denver's Juvenile and Family Relations Court.
4 Whart. at 11-12.
Fox, supra note 30, at 1205.
Id.
Id. at 1205-06.
Id.
Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
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ultimate parent via the doctrine of parens patriae.50 The case
and the doctrine became the cornerstone of juvenile proceedings
throughout the century, and through the pre-Gault51 years of
the juvenile court. The following language from the court
illustrates the view:
[M]ay not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of
education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae,
or common guardian of the community? . . . That parents are

ordinarily intrusted with it is because it can seldom be put into
better hands; but where they are incompetent or corrupt, what is
there to prevent the public from withdrawing their faculties, held,
as they obviously are, at its sufferance? The52right of parental
control is a natural, but not an unalienable one.
The lead of the Crouse court was followed throughout the
country.53
Although in one sense this nineteenth century period
reflects an improving status for children, it is hard to say that
children had moved out of property status. Yes, the state was
intervening and providing a form of welfare, but most scholars
agree that this was motivated more by the state's self-interest in
54
clearing the streets of vagrants than by a sense of caretaking.
And to the extent that there was a concern by the state of
overreaching, that concern was whether the parents' rights were
55
infringed, not the child's.
This prevailing view of the time did not go entirely
unchallenged. The Illinois Supreme Court issued a decision in
1870 in the case of People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner56 which, if
followed, would have repudiated the parens patriae refuge
system. The court released Daniel O'Connell from the custody of
the Chicago Reform School because his confinement as a
dependent child was unconstitutional. 57 The court wrote:
In our solicitude to form youth for the duties of civil life, we should
not forget the rights which inhere both in parents and children.
50. Fox, supra note 30, at 1206.
51. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
53. See, e.g., Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329, 334-35 (1869); Prescott v. Ohio,
19 Ohio St. 184, 188 (1869); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406, 410 (1885);
Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 338 (1876); In
re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 373 (1882).
54. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 30, at 1195.
55. See Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 205, 238 (1971).
56. 55 Ill. 280 (1870).
57. Id. at 288.
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The principle of the absorption of the child in, and its complete
subjection to the despotism 58of, the State, is wholly inadmissible in
the modern civilized world.

The language acknowledges the inherent rights of parent
and child vis a vis the state; rights which legal counsel could be
retained to guard. Nevertheless, the case was not followed, and
was then overruled by In re Ferrier,59 which upheld a processless detention under the traditional Crouse logic. A children's
law system without due process was firmly in place. The
O'Connell logic would not be seen again for another 100 years.
B. The Parens Patriae:Child Savers and the Juvenile Court
The events that took place next were something of an
aberration, but they did contribute to the evolution of children's
status. They also involved, arguably, the first children's lawyer,
Elbridge Gerry, who later founded the New York Society for
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC).60 Mary Ellen
Wilson, a 10-year old girl, had been abused and neglected by her
caretakers for years. 61 In 1871, a church worker, no longer able
to tolerate Mary Ellen's cries, convinced Henry Bergh from the
New York Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to help
save the child. 62 Mary Ellen was beaten routinely, cut with
scissors, never allowed outside, locked in a bedroom, and given a
small rug on which to sleep. 63 Mr. Gerry, who had been Mr.
Bergh's legal counsel, eventually devised a writ de homine
replegiando (similar to a writ of habeas corpus and not the
animal rights theory of popular myth in child protection circles)
and convinced a New York judge to allow these citizens to save
Mary Ellen. 64 This case is often thought to be the first child

protection case. 65 Although Mary Ellen was not the first child
protection case, it is significant in that it recognizes that there
are degrees of child maltreatment that society will not tolerate.
It is not remarkable in its acknowledgment that the state may
58. Id. at 284.
59. In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 373 (1882) (citing Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11).
60. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical Overview,
Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 307-08 (1972).
61. Id. at 308-10.
62. Id. at 307.
63. Id. at 309-10.
64. Id. at 308.
65. This assumption is not accurate because there is at least one other case before
Mary Ellen involving the same players. See Stephen Lazoritz & Eric A. Shelman, Before
Mary Ellen, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: THE INT'L J. 235-37 (1996).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

9

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
66 [2005],
Iss. 1, Art. 1

Vol. 66

remove a child from a caregiver. Clearly the state had been
exercising that authority for over a century as to vagrant and
"pre-criminal" children. The case, and the founding of the
NYSPCC, led to the founding of numerous anti-cruelty to
children societies and the extension of the states' parenspatriae
authority to child abuse victims. 66 These child abuse cases,
however, represent a small number of children's cases as
society's focus continued to be vagrant children.
The events of the late nineteenth century brought about the
founding of the juvenile court. The first juvenile court was
founded in Chicago in 1899,67 and within 20 years almost every
68
state had a similar special court for the treatment of juveniles.
The court was largely the outgrowth of a late nineteenth century
progressive era movement called child saving. 69 The bourgeois
child savers were moved by the plight of poor children and
sought to save them from their circumstances by removing them
from their environment. 70 They were well meaning, sympathetic
(but not necessarily empathetic) activists whose ideology was
accepted by the juvenile court.7 1 The new court was to be an
especially kind tribunal, which would care for children, again, as
the parens patriae.72 The court's jurisdiction typically included
both delinquent and dependent children. 73 Although cruelty to
children was mentioned in state codes, 74 the focus of the courts
66. Thomas, supranote 60, at 311.
67. Fox, supra note 30, at 1191 (see Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 1, Ill.
Laws 131 (repealed 1965)).
68. PLATT, supra note 39, at 10.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 10.
PLATT, supra note 39, at 3. See also BEN B. LINDSEY & RUBE BOROUGH, THE
71.
DANGEROUS LIFE (1931).
72. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. LAW REV. 104, 107 (1909). See also
Edmund B. Shea, The Children's Code and the Juvenile Court, 13 MARQ. L. REV. 208,
209 (1929).
73. The Illinois Act provided for jurisdiction in a special court for delinquent and
dependent and neglected children. A delinquent child was any child under age 16 who
violated a law or ordinance, except capital offenses. Dependency and neglect was
defined, in part, as follows: Any child who for any reason is destitute or homeless or
abandoned; Has not proper parental care or guardianship; Who habitually begs or
receives alms; Who is found living in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or
disreputable person; Whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity on the part
of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such
a child. Any child under the age of 8 years who is found peddling or selling any article or
singing or playing any musical instrument upon the street or giving any public
entertainment. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 1, Ill. Laws 131 (repealed 1965)
(current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 (1988)).

74.

See Id.
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was delinquent or pre-delinquent children. Mary Ellen type
cases were rare as society had not yet recognized child abuse as
a large scale problem.
Prior to the 1970s, much of the scholarship of the juvenile
court depicts the court as a revolutionary development for
children in society. 75 More recent scholarship recognizes that,
while the founding of the court was an important historic event,
in truth, the court was more a formalization of nineteenth
76
century poor law policy than the development of new ideology.
It represented progress, though, in that the child savers appear
to have been genuinely concerned with children's welfare and
were not merely concerned with keeping the streets free of
77
pauper children.
The result of the child savers' efforts and the development of
the juvenile court was that children became a recognized welfare
class, not so much entitled to, as perhaps worthy of, society's
service. 78 The service was thought to be a kind of benevolent
caregiving. 79 The child saver philosophy, and that of the early
juvenile court, was that middle class adults knew what was best
for disadvantaged children and could implement it through a
judicial process that did not require procedural safeguards for
the child.8 0 It was thought that such process would only
encumber the achievement of knowable beneficial outcomes.8 1
With the philosophy of the child savers in place, the juvenile
courts throughout the country operated for a half century as
largely process-less tribunals, attempting to do what was best
for mostly delinquent and pre-delinquent children.8 2 Lawyers
for children, therefore, were not essential to the system,
although they appeared from time to time.8 3 The Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, for example, provided not for a
lawyer, but for the option of appointing "some suitable person to
act on behalf of the child."8 4 Pre-1960's decisions reflect a
75. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 72.
76. Fox, supra note 30, at 1195.
77. PLATT, supra note 39, at 46.
78. See PETERS, supra note 24, at 251; WATKINS, supra note 29.
79. PLATT, supra note 39, at 82.
80. Id. at xxii., 18.
81. Id. at 18.
82. See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 547 (1957).
83. See, e.g., Daniel L. Skoler & Charles H. Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representation in
Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAM. L. 77 (1964).
84. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 5, 111. Laws 131 (repealed 1965) (current
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similar view. A 1944 Alabama Supreme Court case stated that
"a guardian ad litem should be appointed to look after the
interests of the child.
*"85
Courts recognized that
representatives could be useful to children and help achieve
system objectives. Traditional counsel was generally seen as
86
unnecessary and potentially disruptive.
C. The Dissolution of the ParensPatriaeand the Splitting of the
Juvenile Court
The landscape of the juvenile court and the subsequent
treatment of juveniles changed dramatically in the 1960's as a
result of two landmark U.S. Supreme Court Cases. In 1966, the
Court set the stage for dismantling the parenspatriae authority
of the juvenile court when it ruled in Kent v. United States8 7 that
the process of transferring juveniles from juvenile to adult court
required the application of due process to the juvenile. 88 Then,
in 1967, the Court struck down the unlimited parens patriae
8 9
authority of the court as to delinquency cases in In re Gault.
In Gault, the Court declared that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 90 In the
opinion, Justice Fortas reviewed the history of the juvenile court
and stated that it was a myth that the juvenile court had
produced good outcomes by foregoing due process. 9 1 The Court
reasoned that due process, not benevolent intentions, produced
justice and was fundamental to our legal system. 92
The
following language from the Gault decision illustrates the
rejection of the child saver philosophy:
The child-essentially good, as [the child savers] saw it-was to be
made to 'feel that he is the object of... care and solicitude.'...93
These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual
and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not
adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae.

version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 (1988)).
85.
Exparte Echols, 17 So. 2d 449, 449 (Ala. 1944).
86. See Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children In Protection
Proceedings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles Are Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441 (2000)
(discussing the ongoing debate on the role of counsel in child welfare proceedings).
87. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
88. Id. at 554.
89. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
90. Id. at 13.
91.
Id. at 14-26.
92.
Id.
93. Id. at 15.
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The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme .... 94
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the
assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right 'not to liberty
but to custody.' . . . If [the child's] parents default in effectively
performing their custodial functions-that is, if the child is
'delinquent'-the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not
deprive the child of any rights, because he has none [the child
savers believed] .... 95
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses
led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any
And in practice . . . the results have not
comparable context ....
Juvenile Court history has again
been entirely satisfactory.
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
The absence of substantive standards has not
procedure. ....
receive careful, compassionate,
necessarily meant that children
96
individualized treatment ....
'There is evidence . . . that there may be grounds for concern that
the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
97
regenerative treatment postulated for children.'
....
'[T]here is increasing evidence that the informal procedures,
contrary to the original expectation, may themselves constitute a
further obstacle to effective treatment of the delinquent to the
extent they engender in the child a sense of injustice provoked by
seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority
,98

It is compelling to note that the offense for which young
Gerald Gault was to be imprisoned under this benevolent
system was making prank telephone calls.99
Among the due process rights created by Gault for juveniles
accused of delinquency acts were notice of charges,
confrontation, cross-examination, and prohibition against selfincrimination. 10 0 These, in turn, gave rise to an additional
right-the right to legal counsel. 10 1 Children under Gault

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 16 (italicization added).
Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 (italicization added).
Id.
Id. at 18 n.23 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 556).
Id. at 27 n.37 (quoting a National Crime Commission Report).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 33, 55-57.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

13

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
66 [2005],
Iss. 1, Art. 1

Vol. 66

became rights-based citizens under the constitution and could,
therefore, demand legal counsel, and legal counsel would have
clear responsibilities and a duty to the client. As the U.S.
Supreme Court later stated, "[w]hether it is a minor or an adult
who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom
society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of
that person ....,,102 From this time forward, juveniles would
have an enforceable constitutional right to legal counsel.
Beyond the establishment of due process rights for
juveniles, Gault had the additional effect of bifurcating the
juvenile court. 0 3 The Gault decision is specifically limited to
delinquency cases. 0 4 The Court wrote: "We do not in this
opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions
upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state.'' 0 5 In other words, the abuse, neglect and dependency
function of the court, traditionally commingled with the
delinquency cases, was unaffected by Gault and, therefore, could
continue on as a parens patriae system. Remember that the
early juvenile court did not distinguish between child abuse and
neglect and delinquency. All children were to be saved from
lives of crime on the street, although in reality not that many
abuse cases came to the court. Now, we have a clear distinction
between juvenile offenders (delinquents who would be entitled to
legal counsel because they were threatened with a loss of
liberty) and juvenile victims (who came to court needing
protection from abuse, and ironically, therefore, were not
entitled to legal counsel).

D. The Development of Legal Counsel for Maltreated Children:
The Reapplication of the ParensPatriae
At about the same time the U.S. Supreme Court was
bifurcating the juvenile court, society came to understand that
children were being victimized by their caregivers to a greater
degree and in far greater numbers than had been known. A
physician named C. Henry Kempe was intrigued by the large
number of children who were seriously injured or killed by

102.
103.
104.
105:

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
Gault, 387 U.S. at 12-13.
Id. at 4, 56.
Id. at 13.
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"accidental trauma.' 10 6 He determined that -many of these
children were actually victims of abuse and that their injuries
were far from accidental. 10 7 In 1962, Dr. 'Kempe and his
colleagues published the landmark article The Battered-Child
08
Syndrome in the Journal of the American Medical Association.
Through the article, Kempe and his colleagues exposed the
reality that significant numbers of parents, from all economic,
social, political, and religious segments of society, batter their
children, in some cases to death. 10 9 Kempe's Battered-Child
Syndrome describes a pattern of child abuse resulting in certain
clinical conditions and establishes a medical and psychiatric
model of the cause of child abuse. 110 The article marked the
development of child abuse as a distinct academic subject and is
generally regarded as one of the most significant events leading
to professional and public awareness of the existence and
magnitude of child abuse and neglect in the United States and
throughout the world.
In 1962, in response to The Battered-Child, the U.S.
Children's Bureau held a symposium on child abuse that
produced a recommendation for a model child abuse reporting
law."' By 1966, all but one state had adopted laws requiring
physicians to report suspected child abuse. 12 Today, all states
must have mandatory reporting laws. 1 3 In 1971, the California
a
Court of Appeals recognized Battered Child Syndrome as 114
medical diagnosis and a legal syndrome in People v.Jackson.
In 1974, Congress passed landmark legislation in the federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)." 5 The act
provides states with funding for the handling of child
maltreatment cases, conditioned on states' compliance with
106. C. Henry Kempe, MD, et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 17
(July 17, 1962).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 17-20.
110. Id. at 17-24.
111. MYERS, supra note 40, at 284 (citing Children,9(3), 123 May-June, 1962).
112. SETH C. KALICHMAN, MANDATING REPORTING OF SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE:
ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY 15 (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2d
ed. 1999).
113. CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5199c (2000) (amended 1996) (all states must have
mandatory reporting laws in order to qualify for funding under CAPTA pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 5106a). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304 (2004).
95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502
114.
U.S. 62 (1991); People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1973).
CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c.
115.
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certain conditions. 16
CAPTA lead to a massive influx of dependency cases and
the creation of our current child welfare system. Among the
components of the new system was a representation scheme
eerily reminiscent of the early days of the juvenile court and the
child saver philosophy. The new system would be state based
and influenced by federal financial incentive legislation.1 1 7 As
part of that federal incentive, states were required to appoint a
representative for the child, not in the form of a traditional
attorney as in delinquency cases, but in the form of a best
interest representative. 118
States were free to provide such
representation as they deemed appropriate, and the prevailing
model became our old friend, the guardian ad litem, who may or
may not be an attorney. Policymakers once again fell back on
the notion that the system needed a participant who would serve
the system and thereby, it was believed, promote the interests of
the child.
The results of CAPTA's requirement for child
representation have been mixed at best. In some instances, only
a lay guardian ad litem is appointed and the child lacks any
legal representation.1 1 9
Where a lawyer is appointed as
guardian ad litem,120 the lawyer's duty runs to the system as a
protector of the child's best interests and not to the child as a
truly independent advocate. Research has shown that current
attorney/guardian ad litem practice is deficient. 12' Either way,
in this still developing area of practice, we have failed to learn
the lessons of the delinquency court and have fallen prey to a
child saving mentality.
It is frequently argued that truly
independent attorneys for children will not serve the lofty
system goal of serving the child's best interests. Lawyers are
frequently seen as an impediment to producing good outcomes
and the lessons of the pre-Gault years have not been extended to
the child welfare arena.
Children are still seen in the
dependency court as worthy of our welfare, but not as rightsbased citizens.
It is admittedly tricky to fashion a system of legal
representation for child maltreatment victims. Many are very
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
DOBBIN,
121.

Id. § 5106a.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 39.820 (2004).
The majority of jurisdictions appoint lawyers as guardian ad litem.
supra note 12, at 43.
See, e.g., VIOLANTE, supra note 6.
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young or preverbal and simply cannot direct their litigation as a
mature client can. And youth as victims of abuse and neglect
are frequently ill-equipped to promote their own welfare.
Legitimate arguments exist over the precise role and duties of
counsel in these cases. 122 On the other hand, it is a mistake to
assume we serve children as all-knowing benevolent caretakers
while avoiding processes that limit the power of the state and
empower the individual, a role only a true independent attorney
can fill.
Despite the absence of a Gault-like decision in the child
welfare arena, which day may still come, 123 significant progress
has been made toward the recognition of children as rightsbased citizens, and in turn, provision of counsel for maltreated
children. Toward that end, in 2002, nine Georgia foster children
brought a class action suit against Fulton and DeKalb Counties
effective legal
for failure to provide adequate and
representation. 24 In 2005, the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia issued an order denying the
defendants' motions for summary judgment, stating that foster
children have both a statutory and constitutional right to
counsel. 25 Whether this represents the beginning of a trend is
yet to be seen.
Although frequently appointed in a guardian ad litem
capacity, thousands of lawyers across the country do this work
for children and thousands more serve as child welfare attorneys
representing state agencies and caregivers.126 There is a move
to amend CAPTA to require traditional attorney representation

122. See, e.g., Marvin Ventrell, Legal Representation of Children in Dependency
Court: Toward a Better Model-The ABA (NACC Revised) Standards of Practice, in
NACC CHILDREN'S LAW MANUAL SERIES 167 (1999); Donald N. Duquette, Legal
Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles are
Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441, 441-66 (2000).
123. Scholars have argued for the extension of Gault to child welfare law on the
theory that maltreated children face a similar deprivation of liberty to juvenile
confinement in that they are forcibly placed by the state in various settings (albeit "for
their own good"). Additionally, the argument is made that children have a due process
right to counsel in child welfare cases pursuant to the Mathews u. Eldridge test. Jacob
E. Smiles, A Child's Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485, 486-87 (2003).
124. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 283 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
125. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. CIV.A.1:02-CV-1686, 2005 VL 332417, at
*3-6 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2005).
126. Donald N. Duquette & Marvin Ventrell, Certification of Child Welfare
Attorneys: The Next Step in Building a Profession Dedicated to Justice for Children, 23
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 53, 56 (2003).
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Additionally, the National Association of
for children.127
Counsel for Children and the American Bar Association Center
on Children and, the Law have adopted standards of practice
promoting independent legal counsel for all children in child
welfare cases. 128 These activities represent a realization that
abused and neglected children are not only worthy of society's
attention and care, they are citizens entitled to justice under the
law. It should follow that they will soon be entitled to the -full
benefit of legal counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Children's legal status in America has evolved. In response,
a practice of law for children has been born. Tremendous
progress has been made in a short time toward the
establishment of children's law as a legitimate field of practice.
The work is only about three decades old. What began as a
cause has become a profession and there is considerable
evidence of that. Many law schools now have both delinquency
and dependency courses in addition to the traditional family law
curriculum, and comprehensive casebooks and treatises exist in
both areas. 29 At least one law school has developed a three-year
children's law curriculum and offers an LLM in child welfare
law. 30 There are now nearly 50 law school clinics preparing
students to practice in this area.' 3 ' In addition, there is a
framework of constitutional law which defines the relationship
between children, families and the state. Federal legislation has
evolved to the point of defining a national model for the juvenile
court process, 132 and comprehensive standards of practice have
127. First Star, a national policy advocacy organization, in collaboration with the
NACC and the ABA Center on Children and the Law, is working to amend CAPTA. For
more information on First Star, see www.firststar.org.
128.
D. KATNER ET AL., NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES

(2001), available at http://naccchildlaw.orgldocuments/naccrecommendations.doc,
visited Mar. 1, 2005). See also PETERS, supra note 24.

(last

129.
See, e.g., J. ERIC SMITHBURN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN JUVENILE LAW (2002);
R.D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND MATERIALS (1999);

HARALAMBIE, supra note 14.
130. Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Citvas ChildLaw Program gives
students the opportunity to focus their education in child welfare law and offers a
masters program. See http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/graduate/child-family.shtml
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
131. NACC National Child Advocacy Resource Center data (on file with author).
132. CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
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been developed for the lawyers in the field. 13 3 Professional
membership organizations promote the practice by providing
training and technical assistance to lawyers in the field. 34 The
federal government funds research and development in the area
through projects like the Court Improvement Program. 3 5 The
National Council Juvenile and Family Court Judges promotes
judicial leadership in the area. Perhaps the most compelling
evidence of the existence of the new legal discipline is that the
American Bar Association recently designated children's law as
one of the national legal specialties in which lawyers may
become certified. 36 And there are more and more opportunities
for lawyers to succeed in this work as dedicated children's law
offices grow across the country. 137 An underserved client
population for so many years is being served at last. There is
more to do to develop the profession, but like our young clients,
we are growing up fast.

133.

See

ABA

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

SECTION,

JUVENILE

JUSTICE

STANDARDS

ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH (Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., ed., 1996); KATNER, supra
note 128; PETERS, supra note 24.
at
for
Children,
of
Counsel
National
Association
e.g.,
134. See,
http://naccchildlaw.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); American Bar Association Center on
Children and the Law, at. http://www.abanet.org/child/home.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2005).
135. See ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, COURT IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM, available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legallegalres/cip.cfm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005).
136. On July 26, 2001, the ABA approved the definitions of Child Welfare Juvenile
Law and Delinquency Juvenile Law as suitable for specialty certification. On February
12, 2004, the ABA approved the NACC as a certifying body in Child Welfare Juvenile
Law. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services funds the NACC's current
certification program. See National Association of Counsel for Children, Certification,
available at http://naccchildlaw.org/training/certification.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
137.
The NACC operates the National Children's Law Office Project which has
developed a national network of children's law offices. The program produces best
practice guidelines for model office designation. See National Association of Counsel for
Children, The NACC National Children's Law Office Project, available at
http://naccchildlaw.org/aboutlnclop.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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